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Introduction 
In their seminal Dialectic of Enlightenment, Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
W. Adorno drastically portray the scientific usurpation of the human 
sphere: 
That they [the behaviorists] apply to human beings the same formulae and 
results which they wring without restraint from defenseless animals in their 
abominable physiological laboratories, proclaims the difference in an 
especially subtle way. The conclusion they draw from the mutilated animal 
bodies applies, not to animals in freedom, but to human beings today. By 
mistreating animals they announce that they, and only they in the whole of 
creation, function voluntarily in the same mechanical blind, automatic way 
as the twitching movements of the bound victims made use of by the expert.1 
Immanuel Kant famously defined the Enlightenment as emancipation from 
superstition. He argued in the name of science, that is, natural laws. Yet, 
against the backdrop of his diagnosis, Kant equally undertook an immense 
dialectic effort to expose ethical reasoning and aesthetic experience as 
autonomous islands in the sea of blind natural forces. The Neo-Marxists 
Adorno and Horkheimer do not subscribe to such a sharp contrast between 
nature and deontic rationality or aesthetic imagination. They, however, 
follow Kant in not selling out to science every gram of the human soul. 
They note, “art, morality, and sublime love are masks of nature, in which 
nature reappears transformed and becomes expressive as its own antithesis. 
Through its masks it acquires the gift of speech; in its distortion it 
manifests its essence; beauty is the serpent which displays the wound 
where once the fang was implanted.”2 The behaviorists, on the contrary, are 
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blamed for tearing off the masks of humanity, a ‘methodological’ move 
against culture itself, so to speak, whereby the blades of science plough 
through every corner of human activity. 
When Adorno and Horkheimer speak of an “[in]voluntary” 
submission to scientific mastery, they seem to allude to the dialectics of 
self-fulfilling prophecies that encapsulate the human sciences far beyond 
behaviorism. “When the help of psychology is sought among human 
beings, the meager field of their immediate relationships is narrowed still 
further, and even within it they are made into things.” 3  Against the 
backdrop of technocratic ambitions, human nature must almost inevitably 
become its own caricature in order to be more effectively ‘mapped’, 
explained, and administered. 
How can such a critique be made tangible, given that in the current 
academic climate the arts and humanities are not only increasingly 
marginalized, but colonized with suggestive neologisms such as 
neuroaesthetics and neuroethics? If the answer to this challenge should not 
be solely dismissive, it will be rather futile to primarily take issue with the 
reductive explanantia at which science intrinsically aims, in its effort to 
naturalize and contribute to the better understanding of conscious 
phenomena such as perception, emotion and value. Yet, in times when 
advancements in artificial intelligence, robotics and neuroscience head 
towards a trans-humanism that attempts to drastically modify human 
nature, a sober dialectic mind cannot help seeing the flipside of this one-
dimensional trajectory. Instead of allowing humanity to embrace, or else 
responsibly overcome natural constraints that the sciences so powerfully 
explore, a pre-theoretical diminishing of freedom, imagination, perception 
and creativity appears too often the more convenient option. The premature 
expansion of science’s outreach becomes so simply a methodological 
necessity. 
In this article, we will not address scientific reductionism or the 
philosophical mind/body problem directly. With a focus on aesthetic 
expression and emotions, in connection to what we have stated in this 
opening, what interests us are the underpinnings of the explananda from 
which any systematic consideration of cultural phenomena must depart. We 
commence with Kant’s conception of beauty, which we subsequently 
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juxtapose with Nelson Goodman’s notion of expression, developing a view 
of the aesthetic work in terms of the functional form (as known in logic and 
mathematics). By engaging Charles Sanders Peirce’s notion of Secondness 
and with an eye on contemporary emotion theories, we then stipulate art’s 
complex (temporal) expressive trajectories that, as we shall claim, escape 
the emotional necessities of daily life. After making our main points with 
regard to music, we end the core of this article with a brief analysis of the 
emotional dimensions in George Orwell’s ‘Shooting an Elephant’ (1936). 
We conclude with a brief defence of art as emotionally autonomous. 
 
The Kantian Challenge 
Kant’s work on aesthetics portrays reflective judgments of beauty as being 
both subjective and universal. In his framework, genuine aesthetic 
evaluations are imaginative, rooted in a feeling of delight and withdrawn 
from the objective a priori necessities of cognition and morality. Taste 
engages a subjective free play between imagination and understanding, the 
synthesis of which is pre- and, thus, non-conceptual. In the first 
introduction to the Critique of Judgment, Kant highlights with the notion of 
‘heautonomy’ taste’s distinctive reflexive structure as follows: 
We should actually call this legislation heautonomy: for judgment legislates 
neither to nature nor to freedom, but solely to itself; and it is not a power to 
produce concepts of objects, but a power only to compare occurring cases 
with concepts given it from elsewhere, and to state a priori the subjective 
conditions under which this connection is possible.4 
Kant posits that the notion of beauty cannot possibly be rooted in either 
nature or formal reason. Now, withdrawing the aesthetic realm from 
natural regularities challenges obviously a causally oriented explanation of 
aesthetic emotions. Klaus Scherer,5 in a seminal article on how emotions 
should be theoretically construed and defined, draws a crucial distinction 
between ‘utilitarian’ and ‘aesthetic’ emotions, 6  based on an eightfold 
“design feature differentiation of different types of affective phenomena.”7 
In the context of this article, two such design features that Scherer proposes 
for aesthetic emotions are particularly noteworthy: 1) the call for intrinsic, 
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rather than transactional, appraisal; and 2) a low degree of behavioural 
impact. Such Kantian “disinterestedness,” 8  as an alleged condition of 
aesthetic appraisal, however, is not undisputed in current emotion research. 
Scherer himself, after introducing the distinction between aesthetic and 
utilitarian emotions, explicitly stipulates that the autonomy of aesthetic 
emotions does not derive from ‘disembodied’ mechanisms. Rather, in order 
to exemplify aesthetic emotions, he refers to “the most commonly reported 
bodily symptoms for intense aesthetic experiences…goose pimples, 
shivers, or moist eyes.”9 Such exemplification of aesthetic emotions can 
hardly be harmonized with Kant’s aesthetics, which is intrinsically formal. 
Quite in contrast to Scherer’s spin on ‘disinterestedness’, Kant, despite his 
postulation of aesthetic universality, seeks distance to the ‘material’ 
causation of bodily states through stimuli. What Scherer portrays with the 
aforementioned is actually much closer to Kant’s (material) Judgment of 
Sense. Yet, if not material stimuli, what exactly creates aesthetic pleasure? 
Kant says: 
In an aesthetic judgement of the senses it is that sensation that is 
immediately produced by the empirical intuition of the object, whereas in 
aesthetic judgements of reﬂection it is that sensation produced in the subject 
by the harmonious play between the two cognitive faculties of the power of 
judgement, the imagination and the understanding, when the former’s 
capacity for apprehension and the latter’s capacity for presentation 
reciprocally further one another in a given representation. In such a case, this 
relation, merely through its form, causes a sensation which is the 
determining ground of a judgement. This judgement is consequently 
described as ‘aesthetic’ and is connected with the feeling of pleasure as 
subjective purposiveness (without a concept).10 
Further: 
For these reasons are compelled to recognize that the aesthetic power of 
judgement, as a special faculty, is nothing but the reﬂective power of 
judgement, and that the feeling of pleasure (which cannot be distinguished 
from the representation of subjective purposiveness) must not be regarded as 
derived from or related by an a priori principle either to the sensation in an 
empirical representation of the object or to the concept of the object. This 
feeling can only therefore be regarded as connected with reﬂection and the 
form (the distinctive activity of the power of judgement) through which it 
advances from empirical intuitions to general concepts.11 
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Kant’s ideal conditions for an aesthetic judgment derive from the process 
of ‘formal reflection’. The idiosyncratic moving from the particular to the 
universal in genuine aesthetic experience is supposed to create pleasure 
independent from: 1) the bodily sensation an object causes in its perceiver; 
and 2) what the object of pleasure conceptually is. Subsequently, the 
Kantian claim that the predicate ‘beautiful’ is neither causally nor 
conceptually predisposed, puts taste, in tandem with morality, into the 
realm of postulated freedom from nature. 
 From here onwards, we will not delve much further into Kant’s 
systematic philosophy of judgment as such. What we wish to keep in mind, 
however, is the Kantian insight that aesthetic experience not only ought to 
be ‘disinterested’ and thus demands a universal common sense (sensus 
communis). Moreover, according to Kant, in aesthetic perception particular 
formal constellations resonate with universal purposiveness. Subsequently, 
Kantian aesthetics not only stands in opposition to arousal theories of 
aesthetic pleasure, but is equally distant from simplified formal accounts of 
aesthetic regularity, proportion and symmetry:12  
Now geometrically regular ﬁgures, a circle, a square, a cube, and the like, are 
commonly brought forward by critics of taste as the most simple and 
unquestionable examples of beauty. And yet the very reason why they are 
called regular, is because the only way of representing them is by looking on 
them as mere presentations of a determinate concept by which the ﬁgure has 
its rule (according to which alone it is possible) prescribed for it. One or 
other of these two views must, therefore, be wrong: either the verdict of the 
critics that attributes beauty to such ﬁgures, or else our own, which makes 
purposiveness apart from any concept necessary for beauty…The regularity 
that conduces to the concept of an object is, in fact, the indispensable 
condition…of grasping the object as a single representation and giving to the 
manifold its determinate form. This determination is an end in respect of 
knowledge; and in this connexion it is invariably coupled with 
delight…Here, however, we have merely the value set upon the solution that 
satisﬁes the problem, and not a free and indeterminately purposive 
entertainment of the powers of the mind with what is called beautiful. In the 
latter case understanding is at the service of imagination, in the former this 
relation is reversed.13 
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Delightful art lets one discover purposiveness in aesthetic gestalts due to a 
formal arrangement of elements of sensation that is not predisposed yet still 
apparently rule-based. This peculiar particularity, as we will highlight 
below, is also of interest in understanding the source and signature of 
aesthetic expression and emotionality. 
 
The Universal Resonance of the Aesthetic Particular 
Adorno spoke of advanced twentieth century avant-garde as the ‘non-
identical’ negation of modern political and economic totalitarianism. 
However, quite independent from any rigid philosophy of history, one 
hardly can deny that the experience of art, from a diversity of historical 
epochs and cultural settings, can have a profound impact on the 
development of one’s personality, imaginary powers and, more tangibly, 
perceptual abilities. Practically, Kant’s sensus communis can only be the 
result of education, cultivation and emancipation, the ‘civilizing’ of the 
subject through reflective aesthetic experience. After all, taste should 
display universal sensibility. Relative to a particular genre or style, at least, 
this demand is less outrageous than it might appear on first sight. For 
perceptual discernment and comparative judgment are definitely often 
necessary for the detection of a particular artwork’s significance, as well as 
of more ‘trivial’ objects of taste. In one of his typical bottom-up reflections, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein illustrated this point laconically: 
What does a person who knows a good suit say when trying on a suit at the 
tailor’s? “That’s the right length”, “That’s too short”, “That’s too narrow”. 
Words of approval play no role, although he will look pleased when the coat 
suits him. Instead of “That’s too short” I might say “Look!” or instead of 
“Right” I might say “Leave it as it is”.14 
Particularly canonical art is apparently getting ‘it’ right within a field of 
innumerable symbolic options, which supplies an underlying structure for 
beauty’s emergence. Yet this ‘it’ is often located on axes of symbolic 
alternatives that outstrip in complexity what could be exemplified with the 
simple fitting of a suit’s dimensions. Furthermore, what renders basically 
Kant’s demand for the intrinsic purposiveness of the aesthetic, is the 
paradox that great art hits a target that only materializes after its impact. 
With this in mind, what Wittgenstein has outlined in his Lectures, 
specifically with regard to the performing arts, stems from a 
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straightforward observation that stands in the way of simply declaring art 
experience ineffable. Adjusting expressive units that are continuously 
valued, such as sound intensity or the length of pauses in the practical 
rehearsing of a piece of music or play is indeed a simple yet powerful 
example for a case where the subtleties of aesthetic experience can 
materialize publicly before our senses. 
  In order to unpack the aforementioned more generally, as well as 
mitigate both Kant’s non-conceptual and non-causal moments in his 
analysis of the beautiful, we would like to recall Ernst Cassirer’s 
juxtaposition of the notions of substance and function.15 The basic idea 
behind Cassirer’s dichotomy is that generic terms such as ‘man’, drop 
specificity in, for example, referring to a particular friend. Equations for, 
say, the graph-based ellipse, on the contrary, constitute a function that is at 
least as general as ‘man’, yet encapsulates all possible instances of this 
shape type, including the circle form. Cassirer’s insights into the method of 
modern, ‘non-Aristotelian’, science factor also into a curious interplay 
between logic and philosophical aesthetics. Particularly with regard to, 
ultimately, the (relational) predicate calculus, one can retrospectively draw 
a surprisingly straightforward line from, say, Gottlob Frege’s Function and 
Concept (1891), passing through Rudolf Carnap’s The Logical 
Construction of the World (1928), and Goodman’s The Structure of 
Appearance (1947), only to reach the seemingly rather remote territory of 
the latter’s Languages of Art (first published 1968). 
 Goodman’s Symptoms of the Aesthetic16 exemplify how ‘functional’ 
categorical analysis, in form of an integrated systematic terminology, can 
contribute to a complex phenomenon such as the arts. Note that one can 
indeed frame the Kantian definition of beauty in terms of the functional 
form, with independent aesthetic variables along certain dimensions, both 
syntactic and semantic, carrying specific values that afford ‘universal taste’ 
to respond delightfully. Paraphrased in this way, one does not need to 
subscribe to Kant’s rigid distinction between formality and (causal) 
materiality in aesthetic experience. Aesthetic gestalts interest us because of 
the particular ways they form (syntactic) ‘material’ that is necessarily 
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perceptible, potentially affective and, in most of the cases, symbolizes 
qualities and ideas. 
 In Languages of Art, Goodman provides some ground-breaking ideas 
as to what factors into art’s complex interplay of syntactic and semantic 
variables. There, he departs from an examination of notational systems in 
the development of his analytic symbolic theory’s technical core part.17 
Goodman chooses notational systems as initial point of reference due to 
their paradigmatic definitional rigidity, both in syntactic and semantic 
terms. One of Goodman’s main aesthetic concerns is an artwork’s identity. 
Particularly classical music, a paradigmatic “two stage art,” 18  is 
exhaustively represented in scores that provide the identity standard for 
diverse performances. 
 The main issue here, however, is a possible reversal of the 
score/performance direction; music notation allows for an unambiguous 
transcription of continuous sound into a discrete structure. Goodman’s 
identity criteria regarding musical works form an ideal that in musical 
practice cannot be strictly implemented. Its underlying principles, however, 
are not only relevant to an understanding of the diverse identity criteria that 
different art forms invoke. Music performance is indeed exemplary for the 
‘subjective’ rendering of gestalts (phrases, texture, motion, and so on) that 
emerge from the valuation of, at least in terms of pitch (harmony) and 
duration (rhythm), unambiguous score information. 
 Music can of course be poorly composed and poorly performed. 
While this also applies to theatre, in terms of an interpretative ‘execution’, 
it would be rather far-fetched to say that someone reads literature or sees 
paintings ‘poorly’ in this sense. Yet, Kant’s emphasis on free play of 
mental faculties, as the underpinning characteristics of aesthetic delight, 
seems to necessitate oscillation between the level of basic material and 
gestalt-perception, in order to ‘tastefully’ judge an artwork’s particular 
significance. What we have in mind here is not simply the idea that in 
perception, bottom-up observations are interpreted through top-down 
coding, like in the projection of a particular word onto a barely readable 
visual mark. In such cases, efficiency in identification and, hence, 
systematic disregard of perceptual particularities is key. Quite on the 
contrary, the alert comparison of aesthetic gestalts, across different 
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artworks, can direct a perceiver to details that a simple bottom-up analysis 
of their isolated elements would not be able to uncover. 
 Further, Goodman’s methodology cannot be fully comprehended 
without a functionality notion. His ‘de-substantializing’ of semiotics is best 
explained at the basic syntactical level that is concerned with the 
constitution of signs as fundamental semiotic material. In his theory, certain 
sensibilia (‘marks’) become semiotic entities (‘characters’) only as 
elements of syntactical schemata. Identical marks can thus function 
differently in heterogeneous manifestations of such schemata. An identical 
‘C’ mark, for instance, could be used in a text as the correlated alphabetic 
character, but may also function as part of the fermata symbol in music 
notation, or even as nose in a drawing. While this may seem trivial, already 
at the basic material level of character constitution, one is reminded that 
aesthetic symbols, in most cases, do not simply affect us in a causally 
straightforward manner. 
 Now, Goodman’s notions of exemplification and expression elevate 
functionality to the semantic level. Exemplification, for Goodman, 
generates from a selective reversal of denotation. Expression, then, is 
defined as metaphorical exemplification. Hence, every entity can, either 
literally or metaphorically, symbolize what is predicated of it. For instance, 
an expensive table can exemplify being expensive, becoming thereby a 
symbol itself. Goodman explains exemplification with the functioning of 
representative samples of, for instance, a particular fabric. In terms of 
Goodman’s nominalist semiotics, this leads to the phrasing that symbols 
exemplify or express labels under which they, literally or metaphorically, 
fall. 
 However, in relation to art reception, particularly in the case of 
aesthetic emotions, common (verbal and non-verbal) labelling appears 
insufficient to properly denote what art is revealing, which disables 
exemplification and expression at their core. In order to meet this difficulty, 
one needs to find a solution that accounts for both Goodman’s symbol 
creating reversal of denotation as well as Kant’s insistence on the cognitive 
intangibility of art’s formal purposiveness. We would like to suggest here 
that while art, based on its idiosyncratic syntactic material, captures in its 
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particular expressions essential aspects of certain labels, it does so not 
without the labels themselves being re-configured.19 
 Johann Sebastian Bach’s Cantata BWV82 ‘Ich habe genug’ (‘It is 
enough’), for instance, in both text and music, exemplifies alienation from 
this world and expresses ultimate trust in God. By offering an illustration of 
a faith-based and well-measured acceptance of death, in its expressive 
idiosyncrasy, the cantata is able to ‘give birth’ to what retrospectively can 
be considered essential aspects of its formal theme. Compare this, say, to 
Gustav Mahler’s ‘Ich bin der Welt abhanden gekommen’ (‘O garish world, 
long since thou hast lost me’) from his Rückert Lieder, which expresses 
equally disconnection from the world, yet with hyper-sensitive romantic 
melancholy. Particularly in juxtaposition, both works create layers of 
meaning that would allow a sheer endless stream of verbal commentary, 
due to the pieces’ idiosyncratic aesthetic ‘construction’ of emotional 
content in light of deep existential questions. Any sensible discourse about 
great art and its history will inevitably exemplify the insufficiency of 
straightforward categorization. 
 In summary, the feeling of aesthetic delight must be rooted in the 
material particularities of the aesthetic object. Wittgenstein suggests, “when 
aesthetic judgments are made, aesthetic adjectives such as “beautiful”, 
“fine”, and so on, play hardly any role at all”.20 His argument for expressive 
particularism in relation to art is striking indeed: “There is a tendency to 
talk about the “effect of a work of art”—feelings, images, etc. Then it is 
natural to ask: “Why do you hear this minuet?”, and there is a tendency to 
answer: “To get this and that effect.” And doesn’t the minuet itself matter? 
Hearing this: would another have done as well?”21 
 
Expressive Trajectories 
Aesthetic beauty confronts us with an ontological paradox: from delightful 
art, we can spontaneously abduct ‘generic’ rules that only they seem to 
successfully instantiate. Now, as we have highlighted, for Kant, it appears 
                                                 
19 For a more detailed and technical analysis of exemplification, see: Gerald Moshammer, 
‘Routes for Roots: A Mapping Shorthand Symbolism with Reference to Nelson Goodman’s 
Hidden Ars Combinatoria’, History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 38, no. 3 (2017), pp. 263-
281. 
20 Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations, p. 3. 
21 Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations, p. 29. 
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that while the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful is simple, what causes it, 
the formal purposiveness given in aesthetic experience, must be necessarily 
complex or, at least, Gestalt-based. At this point, a challenging 
phenomenological question arises, as to how the cause and intentionality—
the ‘aboutness’—of an (aesthetic) expression could actually factor into the 
particular characteristics of its feeling. Can feelings be complex per se, or 
are they qualitatively simple (yet possibly built into mental complexes as 
autonomous factors)? In this regard, aesthetic experience is undoubtedly 
the chief informant. Obviously, in terms of instruction and communication, 
the search for a proper performance of a musical composition, staging of a 
dramatic text or reciting of a poem, is didactically less challenging than 
finding a formula for how to write, paint or compose great art. However, 
for recipients of art, developing taste and preference cannot be detached 
from cognized comparisons and, often, verbalization of what is perceived 
and felt, be it through communication or self-reflection. 
In relation to the challenge of ‘outwarding’ qualitative mental 
content, Peirce’s dialectically oriented distinction between Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness offers the key to a curious theoretical space. He 
writes: 
A Firstness is exemplified in every quality of a total feeling. It is perfectly 
simple and without parts; and everything has its quality. Thus the tragedy of 
King Lear has its Firstness, its flavor sui generis. That wherein all such 
qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very being of Firstness. The word 
possibility fits it, except that possibility implies a relation to what exists, 
while universal Firstness is the mode of being of itself.22 
What one can draw from this passage is that the idea of experiencing 
unmediated qualia, such as a simple feeling, is self-defeating. For Firstness, 
as mere possibility, is not yet subjective. Subjectivity co-occurs with 
awareness, the latter being always awareness of something distinct (as 
general or blurred it might be). Distinction, however, generates from 
contrast, which fundamentally is a feature of Secondness: 
The type of an idea of Secondness is the experience of effort…Effort only is 
effort by virtue of its being opposed; and no third element enters. Note that I 
speak of the experience, not of the feeling, of effort. Imagine yourself to be 
seated alone at night in the basket of a balloon, far above earth, calmly 
enjoying the absolute calm and stillness. Suddenly the piercing shriek of a 
steam-whistle breaks upon you, and continues for a good while. The 
                                                 
22 Charles S. Peirce, The Collected Papers, volumes 1–6, Charles Hartshorne and Paul 
Weiss (eds) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931–1936), CP 531. 
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impression of stillness was an idea of Firstness, a quality of feeling. The 
piercing whistle does not allow you to think or do anything but suffer. So 
that too is absolutely simple. Another Firstness. But the breaking of the 
silence by the noise was an experience. The person in his inertness identifies 
himself with the precedent state of feeling, and the new feeling which comes 
in spite of him is the non-ego. He has a two-sided consciousness of an ego 
and a non-ego. That consciousness of the action of a new feeling in 
destroying the old feeling is what I call an experience. Experience generally 
is what the course of life has compelled me to think.23 
Peirce’s ‘Hegelian’ analysis of the transition from feeling to experience 
through the perception of a perceived ‘non-ego’ addresses a key feature of 
artistic expression. Indeed, if art did nothing more than causing a simple 
feeling of beauty, it would, at most, function solely meditatively, like 
chanting, or else simply arouse us. Quite on the contrary, however, art 
carries the potential of rapid expressive change, to a degree and with 
versatility that our daily encounters with emotional faces, body language 
and linguistic prosody in common social space cannot match. Note that 
while information density with regard to art’s emotion trajectories, both 
temporally and symbolically, is most straightforwardly exemplified by 
music and literary texts, visual art is actually the most informative source of 
speculation here. For it is fair to say that a perceiver of a, say, painting, in 
most cases only engages in an aesthetic process of seeing if she moves 
between syntactic and semantic layers of the artwork, rather than solely 
getting an instant impression or ‘kick’ from it. 
Given the aforementioned, aesthetic emotions seem to naturally 
associate with a constructionist approach to the expression and perception 
of ‘feeling’, which, in contrast to Basic Emotion Theories and Causal 
Appraisal Theories, speaks of emotions as (linguistic) clusters that interpret 
core affects (body states). In one of their early paradigmatic publications, 
two major advocates of what has been coined the ‘core affect movement’,24 
elicit their approach as follows:  
To illustrate, we distinguish prototypical emotional episodes from core 
affect...These two are also interesting because considerable research is 
available on the structure of core affect, whereas we know of no research that 
has examined actual prototypical emotional episodes when addressing the 
question of their structure…We use the term prototypical emotional episodes 
to refer to what people consider the clearest case of emotion. Fleeing a bear 
                                                 
23 Peirce, The Collected Papers, CP 8.330. 
24 Andrea Scarantino, ‘Core affect and natural affective kinds’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 
76, no. 5 (2009), pp. 940-957. 
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out of terror, fighting someone in rage, and kissing another enraptured in 
love are intense examples. Milder examples also exist…25 
Now, with the importance of a temporal dimension in mind, on the 
backdrop of the affect/episode distinction, the study of aesthetic emotions 
faces three intertwined indeterminacies, regarding their intentionality, 
valence and ontic status. 
It is indeed often underlined that emotions are intentional. In a 
broad sense, exactly in contrast to core affect, they are directed towards 
something. They are said to be about a good friend, for instance, or about 
something embarrassing one recalls, and can even attach to abstract 
entities, such as in the excitement about an elegant mathematical proof. 
This suggests two sides of the same coin in the formation of emotional 
labelling: One is confronted with the ‘immediacy’ of a (physiological) 
state, which in the most straightforward view is simply characterized by a 
certain degree of arousal carrying either positive (‘pleasure’) or negative 
(‘displeasure’) valence, or, as more recently have has been emphasized, 
dimensions of power and surprise. 26  Particularly from an evolutionary 
perspective, in order to identify ‘an emotion’, one has to understand 
specific somatic constellations in terms of their ecological functions, by 
giving them meaning in a motivational framework of action. The latter can 
be seen as a cognitive or linguistic effort, leading to emotional episodes that 
can be (verbally) represented through the telling of social interactive 
stories. 
Intentionality links core affect to meaning, which in due course 
allows to clearly frame emotions in terms of valence, as positive or 
negative. Whether valence occurs in retrospective interpretation of core 
affect, or changing core affect is itself the result of situational cognitive 
appraisal, is not our main concern here. Note, however, that art experience 
is usually detached from immediate situational urgency. With practical 
motivation being removed from the picture, aesthetic expression is set free, 
becoming self-sufficient and emancipatory. While text, image and sound 
                                                 
25 James A. Russell and Lisa Feldman Barrett, ‘Core affect, prototypical emotional episodes, 
and other things called emotion: Dissecting the elephant’, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, vol. 76, no. 5 (1999), p. 805. 
26  Christelle Gillioz, Johnny R. J. Fontaine, Cristina Soriano, and Klaus R. Scherer, 
‘Mapping Emotion Terms into Affective Space’, Swiss Journal of Psychology, vol. 75, no. 3 
(2016), pp. 141-148. 
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have their non-artistic uses, particularly art’s engagement with non-
denotational meaning and fictionality generates its own ‘combinatorial’ 
powers, similar to the immense cognitive forces that mathematical symbols 
unleash. Not unlike mathematics, art compels the human mind to move 
beyond biological and practical concerns. Art, however, stays within the 
realm of perception. This leads us to the third aforementioned problem, the 
search for the ‘location’ of aesthetic emotions. Conventional wisdom 
suggests that when art expresses emotions, it can do so only 
metaphorically. Only the feelings it causes in its perceiver are supposed to 
be real. While expressed and felt emotions may travel on different lanes 
during the experiencing of art, they also do often go hand-in-hand and 
cannot always be de-coupled. The latter case is of particular interest in our 
context. 
Let us first focus on (absolute) music, where, unlike, say, in most 
forms of literature, not only do we find ourselves exposed to fictional 
characters in fictional circumstances, but encounter ‘disembodied’ fictional 
‘quasi-emotionality’. As it has been suggested, music often exposes a 
quasi-subject, a (virtual) persona.27 With the performing arts in mind, we 
believe one has to synthesize a distinction that social cognitive 
neuroscience puts forward, namely between an inference based theory of 
mind and felt empathy28, with the aforementioned differentiation between 
emotions expressed in, and emotions evoked by art. Further, in what 
follows, we will employ two auxiliary notions, of indexical and iconic 
causation respectively, in order to guide our discussion. 
We use ‘XÆX’ in order two signify that an event X causes another 
event X with both instantiating a common structure. Applied to aesthetic 
emotions, ‘entrainment’ could serve here as the most straightforward 
illustration, for instance, when music makes a listener move her body and 
become cheerful in accordance with a fast and ‘jumpy’ beat. Indexical 
causation, on the contrary, symbolized with ‘XÆnon-X’, is meant to cover 
cases where art evokes perceptions and feelings whose signature is 
extrinsic to what is actually happening. Simplistic sentimental music, for 
instance, may cause someone annoyance, or classical music deter young 
                                                 
27 David Lidov, Elements of Semiotics (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 219. 
28 Tania Singer, ‘The neuronal basis and ontogeny of empathy and mind reading: Review of 
literature and implications for future research’, Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, vol. 
30, no. 6, pp. 855- 863. 
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people from sticking around in a particular public venue. At least 
superficially, this allows for cases where ‘XÆnon-X’, and ‘non-(X and 
non-X) hold, namely perception in which what art expresses and the 
emotion it causes appear mutually exclusive. In this view, sad music, for 
instance, can cause a positive feeling in a listener. 
What we call the theory-of-mind model of aesthetic emotions 
captures now the particular case where one might be able to declare ‘There 
is X’ (such as ‘this piece sounds happy’), without embodying X (not 
feeling the happiness as a listener). Psychopaths exemplify this pattern in 
an extreme manner, as they can ‘read’ the other’s emotion without being 
empathetically involved. This thought raises doubts whether emotion 
research is on the right track if it limits itself to the ‘epistemic’ mapping of 
discrete aesthetic features with corresponding basic emotional content. 
Obviously, strong association of stimulus features with emotional content 
allows also for the opposite scenario, where aesthetic emotions become 
‘fetishized’, to borrow an expression by Adorno.29 Quite clearly, we have at 
our disposal diverse routes to making claims about art’s expressivity. In our 
view, what really matters, is here to find out how much of ‘empathetic’ and 
‘embodied’ engagement is actually necessary to first and foremost detect 
and differentiate expression in certain art. 
‘Embodiment’, however, is a difficult scientific notion. We thus 
would like to invoke the more fundamental concept of ‘analog 
representation’, which interprets the stipulated isomorphic causal nexus 
‘XÆX’ in terms of a continuous mapping of a particular (temporal) 
sequence. Manfred Clynes’ sentograph,30 for instance, is a paradigmatic 
analog machine, generating curves from pressure and horizontal movement 
of a finger that navigates on an interface during the listening to music. 
Clynes is a universalist. His analog music interpretation in terms of directed 
trajectories in a tactile space is supposed to provide the key to a world of 
‘essentic forms’ of distinct emotions. On the contrary, by arguing in favour 
                                                 
29 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘On the fetish character in music and the regression of listening’, in 
Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (eds), The Essential Frankfurt School Reader (New York: 
Continuum, 1985), pp. 270-99. 
30  Manfred Clynes, ‘The communication of emotion: Theory of sentics’, Theories of 
emotion, vol. 1 (1980), pp. 171-216. For a more far-reaching approach to the analog 
representation of music, see: Gerald Moshammer, ‘Contour, Motion and Gesture in Abstract 
Score Animation: A First Approach’, Journal of Music Research Online, vol. 3 (2012). Can 
be accessed at http://www.jmro.org.au/index.php/mca2/article/view/61. 
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of a more constructionist understanding of aesthetic expression, what we 
suggest is a strategy akin to nominalism. For instance, exactly because 
music is ontologically opaque, de-contextualized and debarred from direct 
ecological functions, the emotional interplay between intentionality and 
valence often becomes destabilized in its fine-grained expressive 
trajectories. Only through what we have coined iconic causation, however, 
such indeterminacies can emerge, which ultimately makes the rendering of 
art in terms of basic emotion terms (‘a happy piece of music’) aesthetically 
insufficient, or else art rather irrelevant. 
Literary reading is less streamlined and travels along more complex 
semantic pathways than music listening. Recent years have seen a debate 
concerning whether literary reading enhances empathy.31 We would like to 
re-phrase this problem by asking whether temporal analog representation, 
such as the moving along subtle changes in an emotion-laden trajectory, 
can play a role in the ‘emotional’ reading of literature that is similar to the 
case of dedicated music listening. 
Let us just indicate what is at stake here with a few excerpts from 
George Orwell’s famous essay ‘Shooting an Elephant’. 32  The text is 
appealing to us as facing a potentially dangerous animal is a standard 
example of how emotions are supposed to work, by interrupting our 
routine, engaging an ‘old’ affective program for fear that correlates 
motivation (‘fleeing’) with spontaneous situational appraisal (‘danger’, 
‘possible harm’). Orwell, in his allegoric reflection on colonialism, 
however, moves away from the topic of imminent threat by the elephant in 
his essay, by directing emotional awareness towards the observing crowd: 
It was perfectly clear to me what I ought to do. I ought to walk up to within, 
say, twenty-five yards of the elephant and test his behavior. If he charged, I 
could shoot; if he took no notice of me, it would be safe to leave him until 
the mahout came back. But also I knew that I was going to do no such thing. 
I was a poor shot with a rifle and the ground was soft mud into which one 
would sink at every step. If the elephant charged and I missed him, I should 
have about as much chance as a toad under a steam-roller. But even then I 
                                                 
31 See, for instance: David Comer Kidd and Emanuele Castano, ‘Reading literary fiction 
improves theory of mind’, Science, vol. 342, no. 6156 (2013), pp. 377-380; and Eva Maria 
Emy Koopman and Frank Hakemulder, ‘Effects of literature on empathy and self-reflection: 
A theoretical-empirical framework’, Journal of Literary Theory, vol. 9, no. 1 (2015), pp. 79-
111. 
32  George Orwell, ‘Shooting an Elephant’, in Shooting an Elephant and Other Essays 
(London: Secker and Warburg, 1950). 
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was not thinking particularly of my own skin, only of the watchful yellow 
faces behind. 
The narrator, a British police officer in colonial Burma (possibly Orwell 
himself), is called upon to handle the situation after an elephant had gone 
on rampage in a poor quarter of Moulmein (today’s Mawlamyine), killing 
an Indian man. The narrator operates on the backdrop of an ambivalent 
state of mind: 
All I knew was that I was stuck between my hatred of the empire I served 
and my rage against the evil spirited little beasts who tried to make my job 
impossible. With one part of my mind I thought of the British Raj as an 
unbreakable tyranny, as something clamped down, in saecula saeculorum, 
upon the will of prostrate peoples; with another part I thought that the 
greatest joy in the world would be to drive a bayonet into a Buddhist priest’s 
guts. Feelings like these are the normal byproducts of imperialism; ask any 
Anglo-Indian official, if you can catch him off duty. 
To this mixture of two conflicting, extremely negative ‘moods’—the hatred 
of the British empire and the annoyance of the local ‘little beasts’—the 
elephant, later in the text also referred to as ‘great beast’, adds another 
value dimension. First, however, by downplaying the ‘natural’ emotion of 
fear (‘the elephant looked no more dangerous than a cow’), the social 
emotion of pride is moving towards the center of attention: 
For at that moment, with the crowd watching me, I was not afraid in the 
ordinary sense, as I would have been if I had been alone. A white man 
mustn’t be frightened in front of “natives”; and so, in general, he isn’t 
frightened. The sole thought in my mind was that if anything went wrong 
those two thousand Burmans would see me pursued, caught, trampled on and 
reduced to a grinning corpse like that Indian up the hill. And if that happened 
it was quite probable that some of them would laugh. That would never do. 
In due course of his essay, Orwell turns the shooting of the elephant into a 
symbol of reversed social power in a colonial context: 
Here was I, the white man with his gun, standing in front of the unarmed 
native crowd-seemingly the leading actor of the piece; but in reality I was 
only an absurd puppet pushed to and fro by the will of those yellow faces 
behind. 
Juxtaposed with this progressing oscillation between the elephant and the 
watching crowd, Orwell seems to plant another emotional trail, by 
dedicating a comparatively large portion of text at the end of his essay to 
the slow death of the elephant. The elephant is first described in terms of its 
extrinsic value: 
It is a serious matter to shoot a working elephant—it is comparable to 
destroying a huge and costly piece of machinery—and obviously one ought 
not to do it if it can possibly be avoided. 
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After a description of the shooting, however, the narrator engages in a 
dense account of the elephant’s agony, hence almost individualizing him, 
in passages such as the following: 
He neither stirred nor fell, but every line of his body had altered. He looked 
suddenly stricken, shrunken, immensely old, as though the frightful impact 
of the bullet had paralysed him without knocking him down. At last, after 
what seemed a long time - it might have been five seconds, I dare say - he 
sagged flabbily to his knees. His mouth slobbered. An enormous senility 
seemed to have settled upon him. 
Orwell is stopping the time here, granting the elephant’s dying a depiction 
in slow motion. Killing the elephant was wrong. The narrator did it for 
flawed reasons. His motives, keeping face and submitting to social 
pressure, are easily stated. Orwell, however, creates an emotional landscape 
in his essay only the process of reading can grasp, potentially teaching the 
reader new emotional constellations through autonomous linguistic 
expression. 
 
Conclusion: Masks and Faces 
In Orwell’s essay, the narrator characterizes the ‘white man’ during 
colonial times succinctly: “he wears a mask, and his face grows to fit it.” 
This leads us to a brief final thought regarding the idea of ‘ritualized’, or 
‘stylized’, emotions. In a thought-provoking paper that contrasts Chinese 
with Western bourgeois theatre and modern Hollywood cinema, Haiyan 
Lee differentiates between the presentation and representation of emotion. 
For our purposes, the following passage from Lee’s text is particularly 
noteworthy: 
To suppose so is to view a presentational style of emotional communication 
through the tinted lens of representationalism which ultimately rests on a 
Cartesian division of mind and body. In the presentational mode, actors 
communicate powerful emotions and enact intense lyricism not in spite of all 
those gestures and quotes, but by virtue of an elaborate repertoire of 
ritualized expressions. The actor’s body is the locus of emotion, not merely a 
medium for a hidden mind or soul. It is the artistry of suggestiveness 
(dhavani), not transparency, that is the Holy Grail. Ritual enables, not 
obstructs, the communication of emotion, as Confucius already intuited two 
millennia ago.33 
                                                 
33 Haiyan Lee, ‘Chinese Feelings: Notes on a Ritual Theory of Emotion’, Wenshan Review 
of Literature and Culture, vol. 9, no. 2 (2016), p. 22. 
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The recent popular Pixar animated film Inside Out34 demonstrates that in 
popular culture, as much as in scholarship, there is a tendency to think of 
emotional expression as an expression of an inner self. However, 
‘expression’ is an ambiguous term. With ‘an expression of anger’, for 
instance, one can refer to an anger-like-expression as well as imply that 
anger has been expressed by a particular person. Goodman argued in his 
symbol theory that symbolic functions are not always relational. This is an 
important insight. 
For example, there is a very specific ‘heavenly melancholic 
expression’ in the beginning of the slow movement of Franz Schubert’s 
String Quintet D956, yet obviously there is no genuine person that carries 
this emotion, not even Schubert. The autonomous substrate of musical 
expression emerges in interplay between acoustics and psycho-
physiological hearing. This is why we are skeptical of Goodman’s 
definition of expression as mere metaphorical exemplification. In 
following Kant, we have suggested that particular works of art re-define, 
rather than submit to the labels they express. Yet, one must ask, if aesthetic 
emotions are ‘non-human’ and new, how are we related to them? 
 The answer here can only take an approach ex negativo. Aesthetic 
expression leads us to a new, ‘non-physiological’, realm of expressive 
possibilities, discovered in ‘playful’ imagination that cannot be substituted 
with simple categorization or the engagement of an evolutionary formed 
affective program. What constitutes this land of expressive freedom, 
however, is beauty. Friedrich Schiller, in his critical reception of Kantian 
philosophy, provides here interesting insights. In the ‘depiction of beauty’ 
in form of an ‘objective particularity’, as an agent of freedom, according to 
Schiller, the artists must seek autonomy from both their personal natural 
constraints and the ‘nature of the medium’. 
The great artist, one could say, shows the object (its depiction is purely 
objective), the mediocre artist shows himself (his depiction is subjective), 
and the bad artist shows his material (his depiction is determined by the 
nature of the medium and by the limitations of the artist).35 
Schiller also focuses on acting in order to illustrate his ideal: 
                                                 
34 Jonas Rivera (Producer) and Pete Docter (Director), Inside Out (United States: Pixar 
Animation Studios, 2015), film. 
35 Friedrich Schiller, ‘Kallias or Concerning Beauty: Letters to Gottfried Koerner 1793’, in 
Jay M. Bernstein (ed.), Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), pp. 145-183. 
Inside-Out or Outside-In? 
Literature & Aesthetics 28 (2) 2018 20 
When Ekhof or Schröder play Hamlet, their persons behave towards their 
role as matter to form, as the body to the idea, as reality to appearance. Ekhof 
was the marble out of which his genius formed Hamlet, and his (the actors) 
person was completely submerged in the artistic person of Hamlet because 
only the form (the character Hamlet) and not the matter (nowhere the real 
person of the actor) was noticeable…36 
In times when authenticity and ‘personal’ experience are increasingly taken 
as non plus ultra, Schiller, long before Bertolt Brecht, in his eighteenth 
century antipode of what in the twentieth century became known as 
‘method acting’ provides a role model for the comprehension of aesthetic 
emotions in general: the delightful masks that great art has been crafting 
will not fit us if we fail to outgrow our very own nature. 
 
 
                                                 
36 Schiller, ‘Kallias or Concerning Beauty’, pp. 180-181. 
 
